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In this Article I review the literature on the conceptual and analytical
arguments for and against capital adequacy and liquidity requirements for
banks, in light of historical and recent experiences and evidence. Much
research argues for higher capital adequacy requirements given their
beneficial effects in terms of better incentives, greater buffers, and improved
interventions in weak banks. The analytical case for liquidity requirements is
less well established, and current academic thinking is little reflected in
regulations being adopted or underway. While the financial services industries
object to these requirements, most analyses show the direct costs to be
relatively low. Overall, there is general agreement that the social benefits of
higher capital (and perhaps liquidity) requirements likely exceed the private
costs given the many externalities and market failures in banking. It is clear
though that stricter and better-designed requirements need to be supported by
a range of regulations and other actions to have a chance to make the global
financial system safer and more efficient.
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Introduction
The recent financial crisis in advanced countries has led to much financial
reform, varying from globally coordinated new rules, such as Basel III, to
various national and regional initiatives, such as the Dodd-Frank Act in the
United States and Capital Requirements Directives IV in the European Union.
Much of the reforms, put in place or underway, have focused on adapting the
rules governing capital and liquidity adequacy of commercial banks. Debates
about the proper levels and forms of such requirements have been intense, with
stark differences of opinion between policy makers, academics, and of course
not surprisingly those in the financial services industries. To help clarify the
issues, this paper reviews and summarizes the main findings of the academic
literature on capital and liquidity requirements. While the literature is
extensive, there are, perhaps surprisingly, still gaps, with especially few formal
analyses of the impact of regulatory constraints on bank behavior in a dynamic
framework, and little analyses of liquidity requirements.
In general the arguments for government mandated capital and liquidity
requirements, as distinct from what market forces would ask for in the first
place, are twofold. The essential motivation is that, in the presence of market
failures and externalities, private levels of capital are set too low relative to the
socially optimal level. And, closely related, the presence of a public safety net,
including deposit insurance, justifies the state to set greater buffers at the
individual level to protect its interests. Analytically these arguments provide
much support for higher requirements. Specific gains are likely to arise from
better incentives, greater buffers, and better protection of other stakeholders in
case of financial distress, including less cost accruing to the public safety net
from bailouts. Gains from requirements are even more important at the level of
the overall banking system given the strong externalities and market failures
within the sector, such as those arising from interconnectedness, credit
crunches, herding, fire-sales and adverse asset price spirals. However, the case
for higher requirements is not universally accepted, and some analysis argues
that capital (and liquidity) requirements can act perversely, leading to more
(tail) risk-taking. Another risk with (fast) introduction of capital requirements is
that in the short term banks either contract assets or increase risk-weight




Capital and Liquidity Requirements
While a review of the historical and recent experiences shows that high
capital and liquidity ratios support safer banking, the effects of (higher)
requirements on actual bank behavior are less well-known. Examining the
effects of regulation has been empirically challenging partly because "actual"
capital and liquidity positions are endogenous: requirements get introduced in
ways that reflect the actual and expected capitalization, liquidity and profits of
banks, and the conditions and market pressures under which they operate.
While the literature, for the most part focused on the impact on banks in
advanced economies of the introduction of Basel I, has identified a positive
association between rising capital ratios and tighter capital requirements, this
cannot be regarded as a causal relationship. Studies have also found, not
surprisingly, that banks respond in what at the time is the least costly way to
meet the new requirements. Deleveraging, rather than raising new capital, is a
common pattern following adverse shocks to capital positions (and also appears
to have been the response of many banks to the recent increase in
requirements). As such, the analytical and empirical results of requirements are
perhaps more ambiguous than expected. To the extent that there is evidence, it
suggests, again not surprisingly, that requirements affect actual capitalization
more for thinly-capitalized banks.
While some issues may remain debated, there are nevertheless likely gains
to be made from a substantial increase in capital adequacy requirements from
levels prevailing before the recent financial crisis in many advanced countries,
and perhaps also from some restrictions on liquidity exposures. The obvious
objections from the industry, and some others, are that higher requirements
raise the costs of financial intermediation with negative impacts on the real
economy-through reduced availability of external financing. While surely not
universally accepted, most analysis suggests the costs of (higher) requirements
to be small enough to justify at least some increase. A more important issue
may be the migration of financial activities to institutions outside the regulated
and monitored sphere, which may be associated with (some) systemic risks.
Regardless, the literature has made clear that even when well designed and
properly enforced, capital adequacy and liquidity requirements need to be
supported by a range of other regulations and actions to have a chance to make
the global financial system safer and more efficient.
It is important to note upfront that while this review is meant to cover
most aspects of capital and liquidity requirements, it does not address many
related issues important for the functioning of banks. I do not review, for
example, bank corporate governance and its important relationship with
requirements. And I do not review in much detail the moral hazard implications
of a public safety net and the issue of too big to fail banks. I do not discuss the
relationships between liquidity requirements and the provision of liquidity by
the central bank, in the forms of lender of last resort and other facilities, which
played important roles during the recent financial crisis. Relatedly, I do not
review the potential role of the central bank as a market maker of last resort,
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i.e., supporting the liquidity and value of securities during periods of financial
stress to reduce potential fire sales. Neither do I analyze the many cross-border
issues in allocating and sharing capital and liquidity, and assuring resolution
can be done efficiently. These and other issues would require more space than
available.
In terms of outline, the paper proceeds as follows. It first reviews the
arguments typically made in favor of capital and liquidity requirements that are
government-designed, imposed and enforced. It shows that such rules can be
justified for three reasons, related to the needs for: better incentives for prudent
risk taking; greater buffers to support ongoing banking operations when banks
or banking systems are hit by adverse shocks; and a guide to interventions
when banks run into financial distress. Despite these arguments, the literature
has also recognized that there are many conceptual and practical issues with
any such rules, which are therefore discussed in the next section. What the
requirements might actually look like, including the current Basel rules as well
as some recent proposals by academics and others, is reviewed in the next
section. The following section reviews actual experiences with capital
requirements and actual capital in assuring a stable banking system. A
discussion of capital and liquidity requirements is not complete without
reviewing other aspects of the ongoing financial reform agenda that can
complement requirements. The last section concludes by highlighting the many
other steps deemed necessary to create a safe and efficient global financial
system and reviewing where we are today on some of these other features.
I. The Arguments for Mandatory Capital and Liquidity Requirements
The main motivation for government mandated (and enforced) capital and
liquidity requirements is that the private solutions to the agency and
information issues arising in financial institutions-here largely meant to refer
to commercial banks-are not necessarily socially optimal. The general
arguments are threefold.
Firstly, as for other corporations and economic transactions, given various
market and contracting failures, the Coase Theorem may not apply.' Clearly
defined and government enforced property (creditor and shareholders) rights
are then important for financial intermediation, just as for general private sector
development and general economic functioning. The relevance of property
rights has been extensively argued and empirically shown in the law and
finance literature. The arguments for some beneficial, government mandated
rules take on more importance since market failures and externalities are
arguably greater in banking than in other forms of private businesses. Ample
1. The Coase Theorem states that with externalities and transaction costs, market outcomes
will not be efficient even with well-defined property rights. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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analytical and empirical literature highlights how in banking, compared to non-
financial corporations, opaqueness is greater, the ability to increase and shift
risks quickly is larger, the specific forms in which banks raise funds (notably
many small deposits) make market discipline less effective, and other factors
lead to greater agency issues.2 As markets alone cannot overcome these issues,
there is an argument for some government designed and imposed requirements.
The second argument, more unique to banking and in many ways most
important, is that even when capital or liquidity positions are determined
optimally for each bank individually, optimality for the banking system as a
whole and for the economy can call for certain government mandated rules.
This deviation largely arises from the "fallacy of composition," the standard
argument related to differences between micro- and macro-economic
perspectives.3 This problem takes on more importance in banking: individual
requirements neglect the presence of direct and indirect interconnections,
correlations among asset prices, and commonality in behavior and transactions,
which are all high in banking systems and can make the aggregate risk profile
vary from the collection of individual ones.
The third important argument related to the "specialness" of banking is
that banks provide unique services to the real economy. As a consequence,
modem banking depends much on the backing of the state through a large
implicit and explicit public safety net, including deposit insurance. The implicit
subsidy provided to the large, systemic banks (systemically important financial
institutions, or SIFIs) alone, for example, can be very significant.4 And, when
2. For a survey on the special corporate governance issues for financial institutions, see Jakob
de Haan & Razvan Vlahub, Corporate Governance of Banks: A Survey (De Nederlandsche Bank
Working Paper No. 386, 2013), http://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/Working%20Paper/20386tcm47-
294339.pdf.
3. See generally MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2009) (providing a discussion of a macroprudential versus a microprudential
perspective on financial stability and regulation); Gianni De Nicol&, Giovanni Favara & Lev Ratnovski,
Externalities and Macroprudential Policy (Int'l Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note, 1205 2005),
http://www.imforg/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdnl205.pdf. One obvious example of the various
fallacies of composition is that Bank A can have liquidity insurance from Bank B, and Bank B from
Bank A, allowing both to satisfy a liquidity requirement, yet in aggregate, liquidity risk still remains.
4. The subsidy is estimated to have been about 60 basis points before the crisis and 80 basis
points by year-end 2009. See, e.g., Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural
Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper
No. 12/128, 2012), http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wpl2l28.pdf. While estimates of the
exact size of this funding advantage are subject to a number of assumptions and vary by market
conditions, results are similar across a number of methodologies. It translates for many of the SIFIs with
balance sheets exceeding $1 trillion into $4 billion or more of an annual subsidy, with the current market
capitalization of some banks appearing to largely derive from this subsidy. While reforms-such as the
Dodd-Frank Act in the United States and better resolution frameworks in many countries-since the
financial crisis may have reduced the TBTF funding advantage, they likely have not eliminated it. See,
e.g., Joseph A. Warburton, Deniz Anginer & Viral V. Acharya, The End of Market Discipline? Investor
Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees (unpublished manuscript) (2013),
http://ssm.com/abstract=1961656. While some of the subsidy can be recaptured by charging higher
deposit insurance premiums and other fees related to liabilities, these do not eliminate the TBTF
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the banking system as a whole is under stress, the safety net can easily extend
to all banks, making smaller banks benefit as well from some subsidy. As an
important (implicit) stakeholder, the government therefore has to safeguard its
own interests, including by forcing banks to satisfy certain capital and liquidity
rules.
From these general categories of arguments for some forms of
government interventions, the next section provides some specific conceptual
arguments for balance sheet based requirements, first for capital adequacy
requirements, and then for liquidity requirements. I distinguish between three
analytical categories (we follow Hellwig 6 in this categorization), which
nevertheless overlap to a significant extent. I review the conceptual arguments
against such requirements in the next section. The actual requirements,
experiences with them, and the empirical evidence are reviewed in Parts III and
IV.
A. Capital as Incentive
The first and most important set of specific arguments for capital
requirements are incentive related and can be summarized as the need for some
"skin in game." As with other corporations, equity holders (and management)
have incentives to take excessive risks. It is also clear that market solutions do
not suffice to overcome these agency issues. Depositors do not have the proper
incentives or necessary skills to monitor a bank. Rating agencies can lack
information or be conflicted. Subordinated debt has proven to be a weak
disciplining tool. While not the only way-changes to corporate governance,
including remuneration, can also help-because more of the bank owners'
money is at risk, capital requirements can reduce the incentives of bank owners
(and managers) to engage in excessive risk taking and risk-shifting.7 Capital
requirements can thereby put debt-holders, including depositors, at lower risk
of not being paid in full. In that way, government mandated requirements can
help align the interests of various stakeholders of an individual bank and make
sure that more are properly represented. This motivation is even more relevant
in the context of modem banking, where the state is a large (implicit)
stakeholder, as it de-facto subsidizes the debt of many banks by stepping in at
problem. See also Philip Strahan, Too Big To Fail: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses, 5
ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 43 (2013).
5. For an extensive, early analytical treatment of the prudential regulation of banks, see
MATHIAS DEWATRIPOINT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS (1994).
6. Martin Hellwig, Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual? (Max Planck Instit.
for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper No. 2010/31, 2010).
https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf dat/20103 1 online.pdf.
7. While there is relatively limited in-depth empirical research on corporate governance for
financial institutions, it is clear that in a number of areas their corporate governance can be improved.
For reviews, see Luc Laeven, & FabiAn Valencia, Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update (Int'l
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 12/163, 2012); and de Haan & Vlahub, supra note 1.
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times of (systemic) stress. The state thus has an argument to equate private and
social rates of return by asking for more capital than what private interests
would choose.
Importantly, when considering the banking system as a whole, private
market solutions, including on capital, can have severe limits. As one concrete
example, proper monitoring of management and owners by equity or debt
holders requires some concentration in claim holdings. Yet this can increase the
(implicit) insurance these holders receive from the state-as it increases the
risk of related default. With this insurance, actual monitoring may not be
enhanced. Another systemic argument relates to competition: without the
presence of (internationally agreed upon) capital requirements, private markets
(banks or countries) could compete too much on capital standards, leading to
too low levels ("a race to the bottom" in national adequacy requirements).
More generally, a systemic perspective likely suggests that some capital
requirements higher than and/or changed from the market solutions can be
socially beneficial, for example, by limiting overall credit growth or
discouraging the lending to certain activities that impose externalities,
especially "systemic" ones.
B. Capital as a Buffer
A second class of arguments refers to the need for buffers to maintain the
bank as a "going concern." As a buffer, capital will help to protect debt-
holders, including (small) depositors and their "agent," the deposit insurance
agency, from the consequences of financial distress. By having more capital, it
is easier for a bank to absorb losses when hit by an adverse shock, avoid the
risk of default, and be able to "go on." This can be privately beneficial for all
stakeholders combined, as it preserves the specialized knowledge and franchise
value in the bank and avoids the direct and indirect costs of a potential
bankruptcy. Yet, owners and managers may not fully internalize these potential
deadweight costs, in part because of the presence of a public safety net, and
choose too low a level of capital, thus justifying a government mandate. The
argument for capital buffers is (again) even stronger for the banking system as
a whole as the costs that arise from systemic financial stress or distress are
likely greater than those of all banks individually combined. This is obvious
given interconnections leading to possible chains of defaults, fire sales, or
credit crunches, i.e., a drying up of overall external financing, leading to lower
aggregate activity. Higher buffers at individual banks can reduce these overall
financial and economic costs.
C. Capital for Intervention
A third set of arguments for capital requirements is to facilitate and ease
interventions when a bank is a "gone concern." The stringency of requirements
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would vary depending on how easy it is to dispose of assets and unwind the
bank, and limit costs. Capital (and liquidity) requirements can help regulators
as they define shortfalls, indicating when to intervene. As such, having formal
requirements can be important from a legal perspective and be a form of
discipline on the regulators to intervene timely. As for the going concern
argument, the gone concern argument is even more important for the banking
system as a whole. As banks are typically highly interconnected, the social
benefit of having capital provide protection for the debt holders of individual
banks and intervening timely, thereby preventing a cascade of bankruptcies, is
higher than the individual private costs, making for another justification for
formal capital requirements.
D. Liquidity as Incentives
The arguments for liquidity requirements are in many ways similar to
those for capital requirements, except that they are more directly aimed at
achieving certain types of behavior and outcomes (and thus are more intrusive
to the bank). It is clear that both asset and liability structures are crucial for a
bank's sound and efficient operations at reasonable ("prudent") levels of risk.
This is due in part to the act that forms of funding vary in their incentives to
monitor a bank's risks. As noted, small depositors do not have all the incentives
or ability to monitor bank risks well and surely cannot influence it (although
they can shift banks). In principle, some forms of (short-term) debt could have
good incentives to monitor. Whole-sale funding has been argued, however, to
have few incentives to monitor risks as these creditors know they can withdraw
before others do, including small (insured) depositors. Many forms of short-
term and whole-sale financing, such as repos, also come with a greater claim
over specific assets (due to so-called safe harbor provisions), making again for
fewer incentives to monitor. Risky funding structures in turn can induce related
risky investments (e.g., the SIVs/SPVs used before the financial crisis may
have been more likely since they were funded with short-term funds) and
increase asset encumbrance. By affecting incentives, liquidity requirements can
reduce excessive risk taking. More generally, there could be arguments to
encourage certain liability structures, notably unsecured, subordinated debt,
that have better risk properties and monitoring incentives.
E. Liquidity as a Buffer and for Intervention
As in the case of capital requirements, liquidity requirements can help
protect stakeholders and claimholders from bank illiquidity and related
insolvency problems and make it more likely the bank can continue to operate
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as a going concern. Liquidity requirements can directly make or lead banks to
avoid risky funding structures (e.g., wholesale funding), thereby reducing the
risk of bank runs or other liquidity-related events due to concerns about
rollover risks. By having banks "set aside" minimum cash balances or achieve
better matching between asset and liabilities (in maturities or other exposures),
requirements also provide for buffers, preventing runs from becoming solvency
concerns. Liquidity requirements can improve the quality of assets directly (as
more safe cash needs to be held). In this respect, Calomiris, Heider, and
Hoerova argue that requiring a bank to hold large cash balances can serve a
buffer (and an incentive) role somewhat similar to that of capital.9 Indeed, in
earlier periods liquidity requirements were used more than capital requirements
for micro-prudential reasons. More generally, as the recent financial crisis
showed, liability structures, not just assets' riskiness, can cause stress at the
individual bank level. Lastly, liquidity requirements can help guide (or
discipline) intervention, e.g., when a shortfall from a target triggers supervisory
actions, and in that way helps reduce the risks of moral hazard of banks relying
excessively on lender of last resort and other forms of the public safety net.
Many of these arguments for liquidity requirements apply even more at
the level of the overall banking system.10 At a system level, risky funding
structures can lead to systemic risks, as the perverse systemic effects of
wholesale funding during the last crisis particularly showed. System-wide, if
many financial institutions over-utilize short-term funding, runs, liquidity
crunches, vicious asset spirals, and related credit contractions can occur.
Requirements can thus help prevent the occurrence of such events. They can
also make the system less interconnected. And liquidity requirements can be
socially optimal when they indirectly reduce overall inefficient or risky
investments (e.g., subprime lending) or unwarranted asset price booms that
arise due to interactions among banks.
II. Issues with Capital and Liquidity Requirements
The analytical literature has not just stressed the benefits but also
recognized that there are limitations, drawbacks, costs and risks associated with
formal capital and liquidity requirements. As banks are forced by requirements
to deviate from what market forces might lead them to, not only private costs
can arise, but solutions to the contracting problems inherent in any corporation,
including banks, may become socially suboptimal as well. The question is
9. Charles Calomiris, Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, A Theory of Bank Liquidity
Requirements (January 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.bportugal.pt/en-
US/EstudosEconomicos/Conferencias/Documents/2013Financiallntermediation/paper5_e.pdf.
10. See BENGT HOLMSTROM & JEAN TIROLE, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE LIQUIDITY (2013)
(providing an extensive treatment of liquidity requirements); Lev Ratnovski, Box 3.2. What the Crisis
Taught Us About Bank Funding, in INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT
113 (2013) (reviewing work on the systemic aspects of liquidity choices).
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whether these extra costs and the consequences of deviating from market-based
choices for financial structures are socially optimal. Less analyzed is the fact
that each of the three objectives can call for different designs of capital and
liquidity requirements (e.g., capital as an incentive may mean a different
requirement than capital as a buffer) and that the objectives can interact with
each other.
A. Incentives
Again, discussing first the incentives issues, capital (and possibley also
liquidity) requirements could have costs or lead to increased risks as they make
the liability structures of banks differ from "normal" market outcomes,
specifically from the optimal capital structure that maximizes bank value."
Calomiris,12 in his review of Admati and Hellwig,13 also stresses this general
issue.
For one, it has, analytically at least, been shown that as capital
requirements increase and overall funding costs go up, the incentives for more
risk-taking or risk shifting could increase rather than decrease. With higher
funding costs, the average return to equity-holders declines. Since equity is a
call option, the incentives to increase (tail) risks can therefore go up. 14
Obviously, while not the expected or likely outcome, deviations from what
markets may dictate in terms of optimal capital structures could lead to more
risks.
Excessive risk taking by equity holders is a standard corporate governance
problem, but a more important one in banking. For one, banking is a business
where risks are paramount to manage, yet with small margins and high
leverage, room for mistakes is limited. Yet, risks can often be ratcheted up
easily, with potentially high short-terms gains for owners and managers (and
traders within these firms). More easily than for non-financial corporations,
risks in banks can also be hidden, at least temporarily, from other stakeholders,
notably depositors. In addition, to the extent banking relies on the public safety
net, the moral hazard of taking on even more tail risks at the expense of the
state as capital adequacy requirements increases is potentially large.
This affects incentives not only with respect to current balance sheets
positions, but also with respect to future banks' positions. Blum was one of the
11. For a review of capital structure theory in banking, see Anjan V. Thakor, Bank Capital and
Financial Stability: An Economic Tradeoff or a Faustian Bargain, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON.
(forthcoming 2014).
12. Charles W. Calomiris, Reforming Banks Without Destroying Their Productivity and Value,
25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., no. 4, 2013, at 14.
13. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES: WHAT'S WRONG
wITH BANKING AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2013).
14. For an early version of this argument, see Gerard Genotte & David Pyle, Capital Controls
and Bank Risk, 15 J. BANKING & FIN. 805 (1991). See also Paul Calem & Rafeal Rob, The Impact of
Capital-Based Regulation on Bank Risk Taking, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 317 (1999).
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first to model how the anticipation of (higher) capital adequacy requirements in
the future may increase risk taking today.15 This is because banks manage their
risks with both current capital position and franchise values in mind, each
affecting the degree of risk taking differently. While analytical work is not
conclusive, capital adequacy requirements can adversely affect the balance.' 6
Liquidity requirements are another example where distortions can arise. To the
extent that short-term debt holders, including (large) depositors, discipline
banks and force banks to be more diligent in their monitoring of borrowers and
associated risks,' 7 risks could in principle increase when liquidity requirements
discourage short-term debt "too much."18
Requirements also raise direct costs, although the exact magnitude is
debated (this will further be reviewed). Liquidity requirements can reduce the'
ability of banks to efficiently provide liquidity services (e.g., contingent
commitments for loans and credit lines, backstops for corporations' issuance of
commercial paper, etc.). And since very low-risk, short-term debt instruments
can provide liquidity benefits to the debt holders, liquidity requirements
discouraging such funding can be costly for banks. If indeed costly,
requirements can hinder the key functions of a bank, that is, risk pooling and
maturity transformation, converting partly illiquid long-term assets into more
liquid, short-term liabilities. More generally, requirements could lead the
banking system to provide too little credit and liquidity to the overall economy
and imposing overall economic costs.
Another fundamental criticism is that, even when fully effective in their
objectives at the individual level, capital and liquidity requirements (alone) do
15. Jilrg Blum, Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Reduce Risks in Banking?, 23 J. BANKING
& FIN. 755 (1999).
16. In the model of Hellman, Murdoch and Stiglitz, for example, while capital-requirements
can induce prudent behavior by putting bank equity at risk, they also harm banks' franchise values, thus
encouraging relatively risky gambling. See Thomas F. Hellmann, Kevin C. Murdock & Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital
Requirements Enough?, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 147 (2000). Only with deposit-rate controls as an additional
regulatory instrument, can incentives for prudent investment be restored efficiently. In some papers
using general equilibrium set-ups, capital regulation potentially entails welfare costs related to these
incentives and other costs. See, e.g., Douglas Gale & Onur Ozgir, Are Bank Capital Ratios Too High or
Too Low? Risk Aversion, Incomplete Markets, and Optimal Capital Structure, 3 J. EUR. ECON. Ass'N
690 (2005); Gianni De Nicol6 and Marcella Lucchetta, Financial Intermediation, Competition, and
Risk: A General Equilibrium Exposition (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper Number 09/105, 2009),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09105.pdf; Douglas Gale, Capital Regulation and Risk
Sharing, INT'L J. CENTRAL BANKING, Dec. 2010, at 187; Skander J. Van den Heuvel, The Welfare Cost
ofBank Capital Requirements, 55 J. MONETARY ECON. 298 (2008).
17. Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role ofDemandable Debt in Structuring
Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 497 (1991); Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G.
Rajan, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking, 109 J. POL.
ECON. 287 (2001).
18. This is likely more of theoretical concern, however, since in practice, as noted, it does not
appear that short-term debt per se assures sufficient monitoring. See also Rocco Huang & Lev
Ratnovski, The Dark Side of Bank Wholesale Funding, 20 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 248 (2011)
(providing a model with this property).
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not assure proper incentives for an overall safe banking system.' 9 One obvious
reason is the various fallacies of composition. Another example is that capital
adequacy requirements can lead to fire-sales in downturns. As economic
prospects worsen, banks may be inclined to shed assets to meet capital
adequacy requirements. As they do so, asset prices can decline further,
worsening capital positions and leading to further asset shedding and asset
prices declines. Requirements are, however, largely not designed with a macro-
prudential perspective in mind.
It may even be that requirements make the system as a whole more,
instead of less, risky. Requirements can lead to more procyclicality, as has been
argued in case of Basel II. One reason noted for Basel II's shortcomings was
that it encouraged the use of VaR models, which are often used with similar
inputs, including asset prices, making lending and other financial market
activities more procyclical. As another example, requiring all banks to hold the
same portfolio (e.g., a combination of government bonds and mortgages)
exposes the whole banking system to the same risks and can actually increase
overall vulnerabilities. More generally, even when rules encourage risk
management and diversification at the individual firm level, they may reduce
diversity and robustness at the system level as they lead to more common
behavior. Too costly requirements may also lead financial intermediation to
move outside the regulated banking system, e.g., to the shadow banking system
or hedge funds, without necessarily an overall reduction in systemic risks. For
example, incentives to manage risks in a bank could become worse when
franchise values inducing some prudence are reduced; or, as activities migrate
from the formal banking system, systemic risk may be less monitored.
Requirements also come with their own practical considerations, which
can raise other costs and distortions. Capital adequacy requirements are mostly
implemented in the form of a required ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets,
complemented perhaps by a simple leverage, that is, a minimum ratio of equity
to total assets, requirement. Using such weights provides for greater risk
sensitivity in capital requirements, but of course raises the issues of the
appropriate weights and the (incentive) effects these weights might have. Banks
may be inclined to choose those assets with lower capital adequacy weights per
quantity of risk, not necessarily those with the best risk-return properties. This
could increase risks at the individual bank level. Fixed weights can also
encourage investment in some types of assets at the system level (e.g., by
focusing on its zero risk weight, rules can induce too much investment in
sovereign assets, or, as it also has a low risk weights, too much in real estate).
Arbitrage can also happen between market risk and credit risks, for
example, by choosing assets that have low on balance sheet credit risk weights,
but higher actual market risks, or vice-versa. As an example, a portfolio of
19. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 4, for a general discussion of the macro-prudential
vs. micro-prudential aspects of regulations.
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traditional mortgages carried on a bank's balance sheet will have a certain risk
weight and corresponding capital charge. A similar set of mortgages, but now
securitized as an MBS and held in the bank's trading book, may carry a
different capital charge, yet have more market risks. Choosing whether or not
to securitize and how to hold the assets on the balance sheet can then in part be
driven by regulatory arbitrage. And arbitrage can happen between the banking
and trading books (as when more troubled, less liquid assets are put on the
banking book, as they do not need to be marked to market or provisioned as
frequently). Similarly, depending on their exact designs, liquidity requirements
may skew the risk profiles of actual assets and liabilities chosen away from
"optimal" (e.g., by holding more cash banks may end up with less mortgages;
or liquidity requirements may lead banks to use more covered bonds to raise
funds), which may raise new risks.20
In practice, views on the incentive effects of requirements, their detailed
prescriptions, and related costs differ, predictably so, between market
participants and regulators. It is argued by the financial services industry that
market forces will adequately set the level of capital in light of the bank's asset
risk profile and its quality of management. This in turn, they say, negates some
or all of the need for requirements. Even when they do not necessarily object to
the overall capital or liquidity levels prescribed, they argue against many of the
details-for example, the specific risk-weights in the rules. Institutions tend to
say they can manage asset quality and liquidity risks better, and therefore prefer
internal risk based approaches. Some actually argue that prescriptions increase
rather than decrease risk by skewing incentives.
At the same time, it is clear from many experiences, including at even
very sophisticated and otherwise well-managed banks, that the (often largely)
model-based, internal approaches to risk management can also have serious
flaws in their design, application, and operation. This too can be a problem at
the system level if many banks use similar approaches. As such, limitations set
by requirements can in principle be helpful. Of course, as with any other rule,
in their design and application, requirements are subject to conceptual flaws,
design flaws, and regulatory arbitrage and capture, making them likely less
useful in practice than theory might suggest. 21 In practical terms, and
depending on, among other things, the degree of information asymmetries
between bank managers and supervisors (e.g., whether supervisors can observe
the true riskiness of a bank), these problems can negate some of the benefits of
20. See Gerard Caprio, Jr., William Brough Prof. of Econ. Williams College, Financial
Regulation After the Crisis: How Did We Get Here, and How Do We Get Out?, Remarks prepared for
the 2013 Asia Economic Policy Conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, (transcript
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2350564) (discussing risk weights, focusing especially on the
distortions arising from Basel II).
21. There are many challenges with liquidity requirements. For example, what constitute
liquid assets? What are short-term, yet stable funding sources? How does one compare maturity
transformation across banks when one is short in the near term and the other is (more or less) short but
in the longer term?
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formal requirements. The fact that banks have been found to set aside very
different levels of capital for the same assets is indicative of some of the
problems. 2 2
B. Buffers
There are also similar conceptual and practical issues with the capital or
liquidity requirements as to their role as buffers. The main challenge is that the
perspective of the market may differ from the objective of the regulator. For
one, the market may set a higher minimum than the level required by any
regulations. This is likely so in "normal times" and even more so in times of
(systemic) stress when bank capital overall is, or is perceived to be, already
low. Because of uncertainty about asset valuations, possibly revealed by the
bank (or the financial system more generally) facing some stress, markets
would likely call for greater buffers, but raising new equity can be costly.
Capital (and liquidity) requirements may not be effective in these
circumstances.
If effective, i.e., if they do indeed force banks to adjust their capital
adequacy upwards, constant requirements can induce greater procyclicality.
This is notable as requirements would limit a banking system's ability to lend
in a downturn in the likely presence of constraints on the ability to issue new
equity; banks would then try to meet the capital adequacy requirements by
shedding assets rather than by raising new equity. Conversely, since capital is
likely to be overstated in booms, fixed requirements can lead to more lending.
As such, requirements, including the use of VaR-models, can lead to more
procyclicality (e.g., using a model, Repullo and SuareZ23 show that while Basel
II made banks safer than Basel I, it led to more procyclicality). While counter-
24
cyclical requirements could alleviate this problem, they are not easy to
design. Requirements can perhaps be raised during booms to build up buffers,
but allowing buffers to be run down without undermining confidence (e.g., by
signaling forbearance) is difficult. Put another way, it is unlikely that the
market will value favorably a decision by regulators to allow buffers to be run
down during times of stress unless buffers are quite high to begin with.
22. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision [BCBS], Regulatory Consistency Assessment
Programme (RCAP): Analysis of Risk- Weighted Assets for Market Risk, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS
(2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs256.pdf. The study asked 15 large banks in nine countries to
calculate the total capital required to support the same hypothetical trading portfolio. The results ranged
from 613 million to E35 million, and the variation within individual asset classes-such as credit risk or
interest rate portfolios-in several cases was more than eight times. Again, whether the differences are
too large is hard to judge (some differences could be good since too much similarity in risk assessments
could increase overall risks as it reduces diversity).
23. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation, 26
REv. FIN. STUD. 452 (2013).
24. Rafeal Repullo, Cyclical Adjustment Of Capital Requirements A Simple Framework, 22 J.
FIN. INTERMEDIATION 608 (2013).
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Second, and relatedly, a regulated buffer is not a usable buffer if what
happens in case of a shortfall is not well defined. Is the buffer an absolute
minimum below which the bank is not allowed to go? If breached, is the bank
then "closed" or its license suspended immediately? In that case, there is no
real buffer. Or is hitting the requirement a trigger or threshold for other, more
graduated forms of government interventions, with the buffer being allowed to
erode to some degree, yet without endangering the bank (or banking system)?
Liquidity requirements face similar questions: what do we do when a bank hits
the limit? Having a requirement to hold at least x days of liquidity does little
when the bank has reached that point, unless there is a clear rule if and how
liquidity can be run down further. In the words of Charles Goodhart, in such
cases "required liquidity is not true, usable liquidity."25
Like the incentive roles of requirements, the micro-prudential buffer
perspective can vary from the macro-prudential one. For example, requirements
for individual financial institutions do not necessarily assure system-wide
stability when many banks are hit by an adverse shock. Having to meet capital
requirements, some may prefer to sell (some classes of) assets rather than raise
new equity. In such a case, the presence of relatively high capital requirements
can imply patterns of (greater) deleveraging and negative asset price spirals,
and raise rather than lower overall systemic risks.
C. Intervention
There can also be issues with requirements from an intervention point of
view. The key problem, already alluded to, is the need for sufficient "room" to
intervene before financial distress or the risk of bankruptcy becomes too high, a
run occurs or capital is fully depleted. In practice this is often not the case as
buffers are too little and interventions too late. As such, the capital or liquidity
buffer "saves a mere two days." At the same time, interventions can send
adverse signals about the bank and the rest of system, especially when other
elements of the resolution framework are not well set in place. For example,
intervening in a few banks, while not clarifying the status of other banks, can
send a perverse signal. As such, requirements of formal intervention triggers
alone do not suffice. And, again, there is the need to safeguard against
manipulation, as incentives for owners and managers to hide losses and gamble
for resurrection will arise when they edge close to the insolvency point, as
25. As Goodhart puts it succinctly "The most salient metaphor and fable in prudential
regulation is of the weary traveller who arrives at the railway station late at night, and, to his delight,
sees a taxi there who could take him to his distant destination. He hails the taxi, but the taxi driver
replies that he cannot take him, since local bylaws require that there must always be one taxi standing
ready at the station. Required liquidity is not true, usable liquidity. Nor might I add, is required
minimum capital fully usable capital from the point of view of a bank." Charles Goodhart, Liquidity Risk
Management, 11 BANQUE DE FR. FIN. STABILITY REv. 39, 41 (2008).
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examples from U.S. Savings and Loans crisis in the 1990s and the Spanish case
of Bankia have shown.26
This does not mean that requirements cannot help increase the likelihood
of regulatory interventions and reduce overall deadweight costs, but their
effectiveness is likely greater in the presence of and in combination with other
tools. For example, requirements in combination with other rules can set formal
thresholds and triggers for supervisors to intervene. This can work especially
well for smaller, non-systemic banks (as has been done in the United States
through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act which
codified prompt corrective action, or PCA). When conversions to new eq'uity
are in part also based on market signals such as declines in stock prices' or
increases in interest rates on repriced subordinated debt,28 capital and liquidity
thresholds can perhaps also be useful disciplinary devices for supervisors in
larger, more systemic banks.
D. Interactions and Tradeoffs
While little analyzed, for each of these three objectives, requirements
likely differ in their optimal designs and may face possible conflicts and
tradeoffs between the three roles. Hellwig 29 provides the following examples.
To serve as an incentive tool would call for capital to rise incrementally as risks
from additional asset acquisitions increase. In its role as a buffer, however,
capital would need to be calibrated with respect to "tail" risk, the chance of a
large shock to all assets combined, old and new. And, in its role as a basis for
intervention prior to insolvency would presumably call for a calibration with
respect to the ease with which assets can be disposed without incurring a fire
sale. These three calibrations can, and are likely to, differ. For example, capital
adequacy requirements to deal with additional asset risk would be calibrated
with respect to the covariance of return on new assets with those on existing
assets, whereas for tail risk only extreme risk on the overall asset portfolio
would matter.
There are .not only differences in these three dimensions, but also
interactions between capital and liquidity requirements. For example, requiring
26. See generally EDWARD J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN?
(1999); A Rude Awakening: Sorting Out Bankia is Just a Start, THE EcoNOMIST, May 12, 2012.
27. Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions,
13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 453 (2011).
28. See generally GEORGE J. BENSTON, ROBERT A. EISENBEIS, PAUL M. HORVITZ, EDWARD J.
KANE & GEORGE G. KAUFMAN, PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE AND SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE (1986); CRASHES AND PANICS: LESSONS FROM HISTORY (Eugene N. White ed., 1991); Shadow
Fin. Regulatory Comm., Shadow Statement No. 168: Requiring Large Banks to Issue Subordinated
Debt, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Feb. 26, 2001),
http://www.aei.org/article/economics/financial-services/requiring-large-banks-to-issue-subordinated-
debt/.
29. Hellwig, supra note 7.
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a bank to hold many more, high-quality assets is sure to make it safer and in
less need of capital, as historical data for the United States and other countries
suggest (for the U.S. banking system on aggregate, liquidity ratios were
between 15% and 25% in the 60s and 70s when capital ratios were below 8%).
More generally, many of these tradeoffs have so far not been considered in the
existing research.
III. What Might Capital and Liquidity Requirements Look Like?
Having reviewed the analytical and empirical benefits and costs of formal
capital and liquidity requirements, I next review past and current approaches.
On capital requirements, most important is obviously the sequence of
international capital accords: Basel I, II, and now III. The current Basel III rules
are: a 4.5% basic requirement and a 2.5% conservation buffer requirement for
all banks; a 2.5% countercyclical buffer depending on the boom phase of the
financial cycle; and for some banks (designated as systemically important), an
up to 2.5% systemic surcharge.30 Altogether, the highest minimum requirement
in the form of common equity (Tier 1) would be 12%. In addition to this, there
would be 1.5% alternative Tier 1 equity and 2% Tier 2 (hybrid) forms of
capital. All these ratios apply to the risk-weighted assets, where the weights are
chosen by banks with some minimums set by regulation, with the average risk
weight for a typical bank expected to be about 0.50.31 Besides raising the level
of capital requirements, and presumably the quality of risk weighting, Basel III
requires better forms of capital, especially more core equity, rather than the
hybrid forms of equity that were frequently used before the financial crisis.
Many countries are in the process of adopting Basel III, 32 albeit with
adaptations to fit their local circumstances and concerns.33
30. See Basel Comm. On Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (2010),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf.
31. Under Basel I, there were just five asset classes for risk purposes and weights were set by
regulation, e.g., zero on sovereign bonds and 100% on corporate loans. Under Basel II there was more
differentiation, with risk exposures no longer captured at a broad asset class level nor weights confined
to five buckets. Under the standardized approach of Basel II, weights importantly depend on external
ratings. Under the Internal Risk Based (IRB) approach banks have much more freedom to set weights,
with large variations between banks on how similar credits were weighted. For a further discussion of
risk weights, see Vanessa Le Lesl6 & Sofiya Avramova, Revisiting Risk-Weighted Assets: "Why Do
RWAs Differ Across Countries and What Can Be Done About It? " (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper.
No. 12/90, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1290.pdf.
32. BANK OF INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 32.
33. Current Data Collection Exercises: Basel III Monitoring, BANK OF INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/index.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2014) Reports therein state that as of August
2013 of the twenty-seven BCBS member jurisdictions, eleven issued final Basel III capital rules that are
legally in force. Fourteen members have issued final rules but not yet brought them into force
(Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Russia, United States and the nine EU member states that are BCBS
members). The two remaining countries (Indonesia and Turkey) have issued draft rules. A further
twenty-sex non-BCBS member countries surveyed have implemented Basel III or are in the process of
implementation.
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Concerning liquidity, although there have been debates going back as far
as the 1980s, including in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS), no international standard existed until the liquidity coverage ratio
(LCR) was announced earlier this year by the BCBS. The LCR requires banks
to have enough liquidity, defined as having certain assets (High Quality Liquid
Assets, HQLA) on their balance sheets and access to some facilities (including
some forms of central bank liquidity) to cover thirty days of outflows. The Net
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), still under discussion, aims for better structural
asset and liability maturity matches. Countries are in the process of
implementing such liquidity requirements, but when they do so, adaptations of
the LCR (and NSFR) to local circumstances are likely.
All requirements have phased time-tables (up to 2019). While some banks
meet the final capital adequacy requirements already, many do not, as shown in
the latest Quantitative Impact Study (QIS). 34 Compliance is better with
liquidity requirements, which are arguably more lenient than initially expected.
The QIS shows banks in the BCBS member jurisdictions already having over
90 percent LCR on average as of the end of 2011, compared to the 100 percent
requirement to be achieved by 2019. With the 2013 revision to the LCR rule,
the average LCR likely exceeds 100 percent. On the expected NSFR, the QIS
suggested (as of June 2012) that the average bank analyzed had already reached
the required 100 percent. 3 5
As the discussion above has highlighted, the conceptual underpinnings of
standards in general and the various rules adopted specifically are not so clear.
Early on (when Basel-I was negotiated), it was not even clear whether the
capital requirement would be a target or a minimum.36 Now capital adequacy
requirements are considered to be a minimum. Some of this lack of analytical
support is to be expected since these requirements are largely "negotiated"
between various countries and reflective of local and global interests, including
those from the financial services industries, rather than designed from first
principles. The detail of the final standards (more than 600 pages in the case of
Basel III, compared to thirty pages for Basel I) reflects as well some of this
need to accommodate various views, with the exact risk weights likely being
compromises.37
34. Basel Comm. On Banking Supervision, Joint Quantitative Impact Study, BANK OF INT'L
SETTLEMENTS (2013), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/index.htm.
35. See also Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel IllMonitoring Report, BANK OF
INT'L SETTLEMENTS, (2013) http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs262.pdf.
36. See generally CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION:
A HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS, 1974-1997 (2011) (reviewing the workings of the BCBS up to 1997,
when the discussion on Basel II began). With respect to the question of the level of capital "[BCBS
Chair] Cooke raised the question whether the number was to be 'a minimum, or target or standard."' Id.
at 177.
37. For a criticism of the increased complexity, see generally Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir.,
Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., The Dog and the Frisbee, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
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Academics are accordingly critical of current approaches. One of the most
extensive critiques is offered in a recent book by Admati and Hellwig.3 8 Their
main thesis is that higher capital requirements have very limited costs and the
net gains from a 20% to 30% increase to the requirements would be sizeable.
While many others seem to agree that higher capital adequacy requirements
would be beneficial and are desirable, they see more costs and so do not
advocate levels as high as those favored by Admati and Hellwig. Generally, my
reading is that observers accept capital levels on the order of 15%-20% of risk
weighted assets as both feasible and sufficient.39
There are fewer proposals from academics for liquidity requirements.
Some propose to adjust banks' capital depending on the riskiness of funding
structures. One proposal by Markus Brunnermeier et a140 suggests, among other
things, a new accounting rule called "mark-to-funding." Under this rule, assets
that are funded short-term would receive a higher capital charge for their
inherently larger liquidity risk. For example, a long-term asset funded with a
short-term liability would have to be valued reflecting the prices at which it
could be sold when that specific liability came due, rather than the more
favorable price received if it were held longer.
Policy makers have made related suggestions for liquidity rules. Federal
Reserve Governor Daniel K. Tarullo has suggested adjusting capital
requirements, especially for large, systemic banks, for the degree to which the
bank was relying on wholesale funding.41 He singles out funding in forms he
calls "securities financing transactions," including repo, reverse repo, securities
lending and borrowing, and securities margin lending, which all proved risky
for the financial system as a whole during the crisis. Raising capital
requirements as a function of the reliance on these and other forms of
wholesale financing, especially for large systemic banks, would be a macro-
prudential way to force banks to internalize some of the systemic costs of this
form of intermediation.42
City's 366th Economic Policy Symposium: The Changing Policy Landscape (Aug. 31, 2012) (transcript
available at http://www.bis.org/review/rl20905a.pdf).
38. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 14, at Ch. 1.
39. For a review, see Douglas J. Elliot, Quantifying the Effects on Lending of Increased
Capital Requirements (Pew Financial Reform Project, Briefing Paper #7, 2009),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/EconomicMobility/Elliott-Capital-
final.pdf.
40. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 41-46.
41. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Evaluating
Progress in Regulatory Reforms to Promote Financial Stability, Remarks at the Peterson Institute for
International Economics 12-14 (May 3, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20l30503a.pdf).
42. Another model that Governor Tarullo suggests is security-specific over-collateralization
rates to limit the procyclicality in securities financing. Id. at 12-13; see also Jeremy C. Stein, Governor,
Fed. Reserve Bd., The Fire-Sales Problem and Securities Financing Transactions, Remarks at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Workshop on Fire Sales as a Driver of Systemic Risk in Triparty
Repo and other Secured Funding Markets (Oct. 4, 2013) (transcript available at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/stein20131107a.htm).
753
Yale Journal on Regulation
Hyun Song Shin,43 Enrico Perotti and Javier Suarez," and a number of
others45 have proposed a Pigouvian tax on wholesale funding, especially when
in foreign exchange. Such a tax could be designed as an optimal disincentive to
deter this socially risky behavior. The tax proposal can be seen as part of a
broader discussion about whether price-based tools (besides a direct tax, a
capital adequacy requirement also acts as a price tool) or quantity requirements
(e.g., hard limits on certain exposures, such as limits on asset or liability
composition or liquidity requirements) are best suited to achieve certain public
policy objectives. Given the uncertain benefits-in part due to the presence of
externalities and the (informational) uncertainty related to the cost functions of
banks- the tradeoffs between tax and quantity regulations and the consequent
optimal mix are not clear.46
Accepting the de facto presence of some capital adequacy requirements,
yet realizing the many design and tradeoff issues in the various roles capital is
supposed to perform, academics and policy makers have highlighted a number
of useful, important, and complementary design aspects. Goodhart suggests that
there could be an explicit low capital ratio as well as a high capital ratio (he
mentions levels of roughly 3% and 12% of assets).47 The high ratio would
serve as the required ratio, while the low ratio would serve as the final trigger
for intervention. This dual trigger approach tries to balance the roles of capital
as a buffer and capital as an alarm for intervention.
Others have proposed ideas along these lines, with capital complemented
by classes of debt that are more graduated in their seniority. Many observers
have proposed various forms of explicit contingent capital (CoCos), 4 8 classes of
debt that are converted into equity depending on certain triggers (which could
be regulatory or market-based or a combination of the two). To avoid death
spirals-where equity price decline triggers conversions, which end up diluting
equity claims and further reducing prices-such conversion would have to
happen early on, i.e., at relatively high prices. 4 9 Only then could they serve to
protect the bank's going concern value. Conversely, conversion would happen
43. Hyun Song Shin, Non-Core Liabilities Tax as a Tool for Prudential Regulation (Feb. 19,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.princeton.edu/-hsshin/wwwNonCoreLiabilitiesTax.pdf
44. Enrico Perotti & Javier Suarez, A Pigovian Approach to Liquidity Regulation, 7 INT'L J. OF
CENT. BANKING 3 (2011).
45. INT'L MONETARY FUND, FINANCIAL SECTOR TAXATION: THE IMF's REPORT TO THE G-20
AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL 2, 54 (Stijn Claessens, Michael Keen & Ceyla Pazarbasioglu eds., 2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2010/paris/pdf/0901 10.pdf.
46. For an analytical treatment, see Michael Keen, The Taxation and Regulation of Banks
(Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 11/206, 2011),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wpl 1206.pdf.
47. Charles Goodhart, Ratio Controls Need Reconsideration, 9 J. FIN. STABILITY 445 (2013).
48. For a review, see Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al., Contingent Capital: Economic Rational and
Design Feature (Int'l Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note No. 11/01, 2011),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/sdn/2011 /sdnl 101.pdf.
49. Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt
Requirement that Solves Our Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., no. 2, at 39 (2011).
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gradually, for example as payments on some classes of newly issued bonds fall
due when at the same time the equity price of the bank is dangerously low.50
And, more recently, proposals have been made and some are being
implemented for classes of claims that would be "bailed-in"--that is, converted
to equity automatically in case of financial distress.51
Many have also argued for more emphasis on general principles and less
on specific requirements. Some, like Charles Goodhart, 5 2 have argued that the
supervisor using his or her discretion, should be able to adjust Pillar 2 of the
Basel Accord, thus adjusting an individual bank's required capital. Andrew
Haldane and Vasileios Madouros also argue for more simplicity, with again the
supervisor using its discretion to adjust requirements. They and others take
the view favoring less emphasis on specific requirements and more on general
principles in part because of the many estimation issues: basically, the risk
measurement underlying Basel II and III relies on many assumptions for which
empirical or analytical support is too limited to serve as a useful enough guide.
Furthermore, regulations of this kind may be chasing a moving target, given
that firms have ample incentives and ability to innovate and introduce financial
products that escape or at least reduce the effectiveness of regulations.
IV. Experiences and Evidence with Actual Requirements
How do we evaluate these various requirements and proposals in light of
their analytical advantages and disadvantages? Historical and cross-country
evidence can shed some light on this. I therefore review first how actual levels
of capital and liquidity have varied over time and across countries, and how this
relates to bank and banking system performance. I then review the literature on
the actual effects of requirements, even though there are relatively few formal
in-depth, detailed analyses of the effects of requirements. I lastly discuss the
costs of requirements.
A. Actual Capital and Liquidity
Historically, it is clear that banks had higher capital before the expansion
of the public safety net, most notably before the introduction of deposit
insurance (Figure 1). Banks also had more deposits (Figure 2) and held much
50. For such a proposal, see Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Market-Based Bank Capital
Regulation (unpublished manuscript) (Aug. 2013),
http://siepr.stanford.edu/?q=/system/files/shared/pubs/papers/MBBCRFinal08.22.13.pdf.
51. For a review, see Jianping Zhou et al., From Bail-Out to Bail-In: Mandatory Debt
Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions (Int'l Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note No. 12/03,
2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdnl 203.pdf.
52. Goodhart, supra note 26, at 41.
53. Haldane & Madouros, supra note 38.
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higher liquid assets until recent decades, up to 30% of total assets. 54 There also
seems to be a tradeoff between higher capital and higher liquidity (Figure 3). A
simple reading of the historical, time-series evidence suggests that banks
maintaining higher capital and liquidity levels is not inherently detrimental, as
it has occurred at times with high economic growth. In the United States and
the United Kingdom, for example, there have been many periods when actual
bank capital ratios were five or more times higher than they are today, while
growth was high as well. Nor for that matter is there much evidence that such
levels increased financial intermediation costs since spreads were no different
then. Similarly, the available cross-country evidence does not suggest obvious
tradeoffs between capital and growth.
Obviously, in analyzing the times series evidence, there are many
endogeneity issues, as when fast (slow) growing economies have better (worse)
capitalized or liquid banks as profitability and funding conditions are good
(bad). And a higher presence of capital and liquidity in itself does not answer
the socially optimal level of capital or liquidity. For example, if capital were
only there to be a buffer against rare systemic shocks and not for intervention, a
lower level of capital with the provision of a public safety net in times when
shocks do occur could be a more efficient model. That way, individual banks
economize on socially inefficient capital or liquidity (which is kept for very
rare events) and provide more credit at lower costs. However, as noted, overall
economic growth was not low with high capital and liquidity, and the main
problem is that individual banks may undercapitalize or have low liquidity and
engage in excessive risk taking in the presence of a public safety net.
In terms of actual experiences on the various reasons for capital, there is
more evidence that a low level of capital can lead to excessive risk taking by
individual banks or banking systems, but not much solid evidence that higher
capital per se reduce risk-taking. The excessive risk taking, some of it in the
form of a gamble for resurrection ("go for broke"), was clearly seen before the
Savings and Loans crisis in the United States.55 It may even mean a "go for
profit," where firms deliberately incur liabilities that they intend to default on at
56the expense of the state. At the same time, there is much evidence that
adverse shocks to capital lead to less lending, and presumably less risk taking,
among the majority of banks. Bernanke,5 7 Kashyap and Stein,5 s Peek and
54. Charles Goodhart writes: "in the 1950s liquid assets were typically 30 percent of British
clearing banks' total assets, and these largely consisted of Treasury Bills and short dated government
debt. Currently, such cash holdings are about '/2 percent and traditional liquid assets about 1 percent of
total liabilities." Goodhart, supra note 26, at 39.
55. EDWARD J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? (1989).
56. George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy
For Profit, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, at 1-60, 70-74 (1993).
57. Ben S. Bemanke & Cara S. Lown, The Credit Crunch, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIvrrY, no. 2, at 205.
58. Jeremy C. Stein & Anil K. Kashyap, What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say About
the Transmission ofMonetary Policy?, 90 AM. EcON. REV. 407 (2000).
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Rosengren 59 and Van Der Heuvel6o all document that negative shocks to bank
capital have large adverse effects on lending and that bank capital matters for
the conduct of monetary policy. And ample evidence shows that a low level of
capital not only deters credit expansion, but also has adverse effects on
economic growth at the country, sector and firm level. As such, the perverse
effects of low capitalization on risk taking are not universal.
The benefits of higher capital are less clear, in part as some of the
counterfactuals (individual bank default or financial crises that are avoided) are
harder to prove. The lack of clear evidence may also be due to reporting
problems. There was for example a significant reported capital buildup among
banks in advanced countries before the recent financial crisis. Berger et al.f1
documented this for U.S. banks. In hindsight, it is not just clear that these
capital adequacy positions were overstated, but it is also possible that there may
have been perverse effects leading banks to over-report capital and
profitability. Banks may for example have engaged in increased risk taking by
investing in those assets with low risk weights, yet in illiquid markets which
made it easier to value these claims relatively high. And regulatory forbearance
may also have played a role, as the difference between market and accounting
values suggests (Figure 4).
Experiences bear out some of the problems with measured capital as an
indication of the presence of buffers. While evidence supports the view that
lower leverage (the simple equity to asset ratio) reduces the risks of defaults,
capital adequacy levels alone are not a good prediction of the lack of systemic
distress, at least not at the forecast horizons where remedial actions can
usefully be taken. Many of the banks that received public support in the recent
financial crisis reported capital levels above that of banks that were not receive
62such support (Figure 5a). Also, major banks that failed reported higher returns
(ROA) than those that did not fail (Figure 5b). This was largely due to the risk
weighting since simple leverage (unweighted capital to asset) and liquidity
ratios were often better predictors of financial distress, with a critically-low
leverage ratio being a good predictor of failure. 63 To the extent capital
59. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Real Estate
Collapse on Credit Availability and Real Activity in the United States, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 30 (2000);
Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, The International Transmission ofFinancial Shocks: The Case ofJapan,
87 AM. ECON. REv. 495 (1997).
60. Van den Heuvel, supra note 17.
61. Allen Berger et al., How Do Large Banking Organizations Manage Their Capital Ratios?,
34 J. FIN. SERV.'S RES. 123 (2008).
62. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, Ch. 3 (2009).
63. See Lev Ratnovski & Rocco Huang, Why are Canadian Banks More Resilient? (Int'l
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 09/152, 2009),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09l52.pdf. Also, Ash Demirguc-Kunt, Enrica
Detragiache, and Ouarda Merrouche find that during the recent crisis relationships between stock returns
and capital are stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk-adjusted
capital ratio, and that higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity,
were more relevant for stock returns. Ash Demirguc-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache & Ouarda Merrouche,
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adequacy is an important predictor of financial distress, the relationship only
appears at very low levels (below or above 4%).
In terms of its role for a gone concern, it is clear that bank losses can be
large both individually and at the system level. At the bank level, the deposit
insurance scheme in the United States (the FDIC) regularly incurs costs (albeit
recovered by premiums), even though it largely addresses small weak banks.
This suggests that buffers are too low and/or that the agency intervenes, on
average, too late. This is worrisome since one reason for capital requirements is
exactly to protect the taxpayer (in the presence of a public safety net, including
deposit insurance). At the system level, evidence from advanced countries
suggests that actual losses (measured as non-performing loans, NPLs) can be
high, up to 19% of assets (Ratnovski,6 Figure 6). To cover such losses with
capital could mean a capital requirement of some 9%, as the average bank
holds assets with a risk-weighting of about 50%.65 While this is just one
benchmark, it suggests that capital requirements should be higher than
currently required to cover those systemic crises that seem to occur with some
frequency. 6 6
Overall, experiences are that real buffers are limited, that interventions are
generally too late-especially, but not only for systemic banks-and that losses
(paid for by other claim-holders and the state) can be considerable. The
problem in part arises because banks under stress will tend to overstate their
regulatory capital, as in the recent crisis (of course, there is also regulatory
forbearance, which may or may not be optimal from an overall economic point
of view). Banks also weaken their forms of capital when under stress. Bankia
in Spain is clearly such a case, where new preferred equity was issued at a point
when the bank was likely already close to insolvent (Figure 7). This helps
explain the (few) empirical studies finding a relationship between level of bank
capital ex ante and bank vulnerability ex-post and makes capital less useful for
early remedial actions.
Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 10/286,
2010), http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wpl0286.pdf.
64. Lev Ratnovski, How Much Capital Should Banks Have?, VOX (July 28, 2013),
www.voxeu.org/article/how-much-capital-should-banks-have.
65. Le Lesl6 & Avramova, supra note 32.
66. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic
Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl73.pdf.
67. As an example, Harry Huizinga and Luc Laeven find that the market discounts on banks'
real estate loans starting in 2008 explains much of low stock prices of banks (real estate is about half of
a typical bank's assets. Harry Huizinga & Luc Laeven, Bank Valuation and Accounting Discretion
During a Financial Crisis, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 614 (2012). While this may not surprise, it was also found
that banks with large MBS exposure report lower loan-loss provisioning in 2008. This suggests that
weaker banks tweaked their regulatory capital, in part by classifying their MBS in such a way as to take
advantage of valuation differences.
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B. Requirements
In terms of evidence of the role of requirements, as opposed to actual
capital or liquidity positions, solid evidence is limited. Many analyses struggle
with the problem of attribution: with requirements being put in place in
response to or at least considering the actual positions of banks, it is hard to
detect clear causal effects. And variations in bank capitalization levels could be
driven by other factors, such as the business cycle or market discipline. Banks
can also adjust to new capital ratios in many different ways, with the impact on
bank behavior, and risk in particular, ambiguous. In broad terms and ignoring
simple misreporting, banks can increase capital, contract lending, change the
risk profile of assets, or engage in regulatory arbitrage. These adjustments
depend on the least cost alternative, with opportunity costs likely to be bank
specific.
With these important caveats in mind, most studies document a rise in
observed capital ratios following increases in capital requirements. However,
endogeneity and omitted variable concerns imply that these results, especially
when using time series data, should not be interpreted as causal evidence. For
instance, the Basel I accord was introduced in 1991 in the U.S., but around the
same time the country underwent a recession. Rising capital ratios following
the accord could then be the consequence of a recovering economy. A better
way is to look at differential effects among banks depending on their level of
68 6capitalization. Examples of such studies are Keeley, Shrieves and Dahl,
Jacques and Nigro,7 Aggarwal and Jacques,71 Hancock and Wilcox,72 Ediz et
al., 73 and Rime.74 They arrive at broadly similar conclusions, namely, that
banks with low capital ratios exhibit faster adjustment than better capitalized
banks following changes in regulation. Also, some empirical evidence from the
75 76United Kingdom by Alfon et al. and Francis and Osborne suggests that
68. Michael C. Keeley, Bank Capital Regulation in the 1980s: Effective or Ineffective?, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO ECON. REv., Winter 1988, at 3.
69. Drew Dahl & Ronald E. Shrieves, The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in
Commercial Banks, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 439 (1992); Drew Dahl & Ronald E. Shrieves, The Impact of
Regulation on Bank Equity Infusions, 14 J. BANKING & FIN., 1209 (1990).
70. Kevin Jacques & Peter Nigro, Risk-Based Capital, Portfolio Risk and Bank Capital: A
Simultaneous Equations Approach, 49 J. ECON. & Bus. 533 (1997).
71. Raj Aggarwal & Kevin T. Jacques, Assessing the Impact Prompt Corrective Action on
Bank Capital and Risk, 4 ECON. POL'Y REv., Oct. 1998, at 23.
72. Diana Hancock & James A. Wilcox, Bank Capital, Non-Bank Finance, and Real Estate
Activity, 8 J. HOuSING RES. 75 (1997).
73. Tolga Ediz, Ian Michael & William Perraudin, Bank Capital Dynamics and Regulatory
Policy (unpublished manuscript) (1998).
74. Bertrand Rime, Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: Empirical Evidence for
Switzerland, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 789 (2001).
75. Isaac Alfon, Isabel Argim6n, & Patricia Bascufiana-Ambr6s, How Individual Capital
Requirements Affect Capital Ratios in United Kingdom Banks and Building Societies' (Bank of Spain
Working Paper No. 515, 2005)
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capital requirements do affect actual capital levels, at least for those banks for
whom the capital constraints are (close to) binding. It may also be that equity
issues to capital requirements are associated with lower discount as there is less
of an adverse signal.77
Studies on whether banks raise equity or adjust assets in response to
requirements have found that banks do both. Dahl and Shrieves78 find that the
degree of undercapitalization is a powerful predictor of equity issuance,
regardless of market conditions. Aggarwal and Jacques79 and Ediz et al.so
conclude that regulation has a bigger impact on banks' long term targets of Tier
1 capital than that of overall capital. Ediz et al. find that banks adjust Tier 2
capital before adjusting Tier 1 capital. 1 Ito and Sasaki, concerned with Japan,
also find that subordinated debt issuance responds strongly to stock market
fluctuations.82
Other papers find that banks also adjust the asset side of their balance
sheets, either by contracting lending, altering the risk composition of assets,84
or engaging in regulatory arbitrage. In the latter case, securitization and special
purpose vehicles are prominent examples. In a recent study from the United
Kingdom, Aiyar et al., shows that about a half of banks' short-term response to
an increase in capital requirements occurs through a contraction of balance
sheets. No convincing support is found as to whether banks increase risk-
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosTrabajo/0
5/Fic/dtO515e.pdf
76. William Francis & Matthew Osborne, Bank Regulation, Capital and Credit Supply:
Measuring the Impact ofPrudential Standards (Fin. Services Authority Occasional Paper Series No. 36,
2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op36.pdf.
77. Marcia M. Cornett & Hassan Tehranian, An Examination of Voluntary Versus Involuntary
Security Issuances by Commercial Banks, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 99 (1994).
78. Drew Dahl & Ronald Shrieves, The Impact of Regulation on Bank Equity Infusions, 14 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1209 (1990).
79. Aggarwal & Jacques, supra note 72.
80. Ediz, Michael & Perraudin, supra note 74.
81. Id.
82. Takatoshi Ito & Yuri Nagataki Sasaki, Impacts of the Basle Capital Standard on Japanese
Banks' Behaviour (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6730, 1998),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6730.pdfnew window- 1.
83. E.g., Diana Hancock & James A. Wilcox, Bank Capital and the Credit Crunch: The Roles
of Risk-Weighted and Unweighted Capital Regulation, 22 J. AM. REAL ESTATE & URBAN ECON. Ass'N
59 (1994); Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Did Risk-Based Capital Allocate Bank Credit and
Cause a "Credit Crunch" in the United States?, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 58 (1994).
84. E.g., Drew Dahl & Ronald Shrieves, The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in
Commercial Banks, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 439 (1992); Kevin Jacques & Peter Nigro, Risk-Based
Capital, Portfolio Risk and Bank Capital: A Simultaneous Equations Approach, 49 J. OF ECON. & Bus.
533 (1997); Aggarwal & Jacques, supra note 72; Rime, supra note 75.
85. Patricia Jackson, Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior: The Impact of the Basel
Accord (Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Working Paper No. 1, 1999),
http://www.bis.org/publbcbswpl.pdf.
86. Shekhar Aiyar, Charles W. Calomiris & Tomasz Wieladek, Does Macro-Pru leak? (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17822, 2012),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl7822.pdf?new window-l. They also report though evidence of
significant leakages, with up to 1/ 3 of the initial impulse of capital requirements being offset through
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taking, by choosing to lend to the riskiest borrowers within a risk weight
category, mainly since studies do not find significant differential behavior
among highly- and poorly-capitalized banks.87
Cross-country work finds some role for capital requirements, but other
factors are found to play important roles as well. Brewer, Kaufman, and Wall,
using data for 78 large private banks in 12 industrial countries between 1992
and 2005, show that banks maintain higher capital ratios in not only in home
countries that have more stringent capital requirements, but also in countries in
which the bank sector is relatively smaller, where prompt corrective action is
practiced more actively and corporate governance structures are more
effective.88 In contrast, Heider and Gropp do not find that regulatory factors
help explain the variation in capital structures of large U.S. and European banks
during the period from 1991 to 2004.89 Rather, They find that mispriced deposit
insurance and capital regulations were of second-order importance in
determining the capital structure relative to standard cross-sectional
determinants of non-financial firms' leverage and unobserved time-invariant
bank fixed-effects.
Analysis also finds that formal capital requirements do not necessarily
mean less risks overall. Using data for more than 3,000 banks in 86 countries,
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache find that neither an overall index of
compliance with the Basel Core Principles nor the individual components of
the index are robustly associated with bank risk (measured by Z-score, a proxy
for default risk, typically measured as the ratio of the capital of the bank to the
standard deviation of its profits, with a lower ratio indicating a riskier bank).90
Evidence suggests rather that, besides actual capital and liquidity position, it is
the overall regulatory environment and some specific rules (those encouraging
for example market discipline, including by having a small safety net) that help
reduce overall systemic risk taking.91
lending by non-affected banks (that is, foreign branches operating in the UK). In a follow-up paper, also
controlling for within bank groups regulatory arbitrage and competition, the same authors refine the
number to about 43%.
87. Frederick T. Furlong, Changes in Bank Risk Taking, FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN
FRANCISCO EcON. REv., Spring 1988, at 45; George Sheldon, Capital Adequacy Rules and the Risk-
Seeking Behavior ofBanks: A Firm-Level Analysis, 132 Swiss J. ECON. & STAT. 709 (1996).
88. Elijah Brewer I et al., Bank Capital Ratios Across Countries: Why Do They Vary?, 34 J.
FIN. SERVICES RES. 177 (2008).
89. Reint Gropp & Florian Heider, The Determinants of Bank Capital Structure, 14 REV. FIN.
587 (2010).
90. Ash Demirguig-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, Enrica, 2011. Basel Core Principles and Bank
Soundness: Does Compliance Matter?, 7 J. FIN. STABILITY 179 (2011).
91. See Ash Demirgag-Kunt et al., Banking on the Principles: Compliance with Basel Core
Principles and Bank Soundness, 7 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 511 (2008); see also JAMES BARTH ET AL.,
GUARDIANS OF FINANCE: MAKING REGULATORS WORK FOR US (2012) (offering specific analysis of the
beneficial (or not) role of supervisors); Martin Cihdk et al., Bank Regulation and Supervision Around the
World A Crisis Update (World Bank Pol'y Research Working Paper 6286, 2012) (providing an in-
depth comparison of regulation and supervision in countries that were directly hit by the recent financial
crisis and those that were not).
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C. Cost ofRequirements
As most observers and much research argue that the benefits of higher
requirements seem considerable, the important question becomes "what are the
economic costs of higher requirements?" In Modigliani and Miller's perfect
financial markets world, there would not be any impact, as asset and activity
choices are not affected by liability structures, and banks would continue to
operate as is (but just allocate their net earnings differently between equity and
debt claims). But there are many real world deviations: the tax benefits of debt
financing, agency and information asymmetry issues, imperfect corporate
governance and contracting arrangements, the costs of raising equity (quickly),
etc.
The perspective of the industry is, of course, largely predictable: it
generally objects to higher requirements. But the reasoning is not always clear.
One line of argument is straightforward: the higher costs of equity and reduced
tax benefits from debt will lead to higher intermediation costs, which in turn
lower lending, with adverse consequences on economic growth. But the
industry surely overstates the case, as a report by the Institute of International
Finance argues that the impact could total 3.2 percent of GDP over five years
for the United States, Euro Area, Japan, United Kingdom and Switzerland. 92
This study has been heavily criticized as being an overly pessimistic
assessment. But the financial services industry too also employs some
"fallacies." It also appears that the objections of the industry reflect more the
managerial interests than bank shareholders' views and certainly not overall
stakeholders' views.
Conclusive empirical evidence of costs of formal requirements is scarce,
in large part due to similar endogeneity and omitted variable concerns that
plague studies on the effects of requirements. As such, time series based
evidence is not as useful. In terms of performance, if anything higher capital
tends to go together with higher return on assets for the banking system on
aggregate (Figure 8). Again, this is likely influenced by, besides reporting
biases, the state of the economy. Furthermore, the actual costs of equity and
various debt financing instruments are heavily influenced by, besides tax
shield, the distortions of deposit insurance and other aspects of the public safety
net.
A more useful way to address the cost question is through simulations.
Two ways have been used to calculate the effect of higher capital on the bank's
cost of funding. One very simple way used by Elliott is to keep the costs of
banks' debt and equity exogenous.9 3 Assume for example that the required
92. INST. OF INT'L FIN., THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY OF CHANGES
IN THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2011).
93. Douglas J. Elliott, Quantifying the Effects on Lending of Increased Capital Requirements
(Sept. 21, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, Brookings Institution),
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return on bank equity is 15% and the average cost of bank debt is 4% (3% net
of tax shield), which means a relatively large wedge between debt and equity
costs. 94 Then an increase in banks' risk-weighted capital ratio of 1 percentage
point, equivalent to a shift of 0.5% of funding from debt to equity (given an
average risk weight of 0.5), would increase the average cost of capital by 6
basis points. This type of analysis produces the highest possible costs. While
BCBS shows even higher costs from the Basel III level of requirements, it still
concludes that costs are limited and benefits outweigh them.95
As Admati and Hellwig also argue, much of this ignores the Modigliani-
Miller (M&M) proposition that the banks' overall cost of funding should not
increase with higher equity (as equity and debt become safer and cheaper),
except for the tax shield effect. 9 6 Another form of analysis then finds-under
some assumptions-that an increase in the banks' risk-weighted capital ratio by
1 percentage point would increase the weighted average cost of capital by just 1
basis point. Under some additional departures from M&M, the cost can be
somewhat higher: Kashyap et al., for example, suggest some 2.25 basis points
for a 1 percentage point increase.97 Again, costs remain quite limited.
Reviewing a number of approaches, Santos and Elliott find that a 1
percentage point increase in capital ratios would imply additional costs for an
average bank of between 1 and 6 basis points (the range varies with
assumptions about capital structure irrelevancy, the cost of equity versus debt,
and the tax shield). These are small amounts: if capital ratios were to rise due
to requirements by a full 6 percentage points, the costs would be 36 basis points
at most. And this would only be an additional cost if this truly is an additional
capital need above what markets would require in the first place. Estimates for
the costs of currently envisioned liquidity requirements provided by Santos and
Elliott are between 14 and 21 basis points.99 Overall, while numbers vary
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/9/24%20capital%20elliott/0924_capital-e
Iliott.pdf.
94. The historical average nominal cost of debt (interest expenses over all liabilities) for the
sample of 6,600 banks in 13 OECD countries over the 15-year period from 1993 to 2007 used by Basel
Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 67, is some 4 percentage points. As banks likely substitute
more expensive forms of debt for equity, the marginal debt cost saved is likely higher, reducing the costs
of switching from debt to equity.
95. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 67. The BCBS study finds that each 1
percentage point increase in the capital ratio raises loan spreads by 13 basis points. Liquidity standards
raise spreads by about 25 basis points when risk-weighted assets (RWA) are left unchanged, and by 14
basis points or less after taking account of the fall in RWA and the corresponding lower regulatory
capital needs.
96. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 12. Ch. 7.
97. Anil K. Kashyap et al., An Analysis of the Impact of "Substantially Heightened" Capital
Requirements on Large Financial Institutions (unpublished manuscript) (May 2010),
http://www.people.hbs.edu/shanson/Clearinghouse-paper-final_20100521 .pdf.
98. Andr6 Oliveira Santos & Douglas Elliott, Estimating the Costs of Financial Regulation,
International Monetary Fund (Int'l Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note No. 12/11, 2012),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdnl211.pdf.
99. Id. at 16, tbl. 3.
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between types of banks and countries (U.S. banks for example are more
affected), the total estimated cumulative costs of currently envisioned capital
and liquidity requirements, as well as some other new rules (such as those for
derivatives), do not appear to exceed 50 basis points. 00
These admittedly simple calculations generally show small cost effects.
And, even with these small costs, there would still be several margins along
which banks could adjust. For one, increases could be met by a reduction in
costs or changes in mix of activities or funding, some of which may be useful
in their own right (e.g., as they represented too much risk). With some
reasonable assumptions about adjustment, Santos and Elliott show that their
overall costs come down to a maximum of 28 basis points.o10 Or, if it results in
an increase in the net interest margin, it could fall on either lending or deposit
rates, or on the costs of other financial services. And, even if it were to fall
fully on lending rates, the economic costs, while hard to assess, are likely to be
small.102 In a context where the interest rate moves in similar such amounts
without major macroeconomic consequences, it is hard to argue that this range
of costs is very detrimental. A bigger issue may be "dis-intermediation," where
activities migrate to less regulated parts of the financial services industries.
Only to the extent this raises new sources of systemic risk, however, should this
be a source of concern.
Most of this analysis is based though on the steady state. The transition
effects of higher requirements, however, might be more important, as there are
fewer ways for banks to adjust. At the same time, they are also harder to judge,
in part because banks adjust is not clear, but also because the costs of raising
capital or liquidity quickly are not well known. A comprehensive study
suggests a modest impact on aggregate output in the transition towards higher
standards.10 3 Taking the median across all results, increases in domestic lending
spreads were estimated to be of about 15 basis points, and declines in lending
volumes 1.4%. In turn, this has small effects on growth. Median estimates are
that a 1 percentage point increase in the target ratio of tangible common equity
to risk-weighted assets leads to a decline in the level of GDP by a maximum of
about 0.19% from the baseline path after four and a half years (equivalent to a
reduction in the annual growth rate of 0.04 percentage points over this
100. Id. at 21, tbl. 6.
101. Id.
102. Assessing the long-run steady state impact, BCBS, supra note 67, assumes that the higher
requirements increase the cost of bank credit without additional non-price restrictions (e.g., no credit
rationing). The higher cost lowers investment and consumption, in turn influencing the steady-state level
of output. In the median estimate across countries a 1 percentage point increase in the capital ratio
translates into a 0.09% decline in the level of output relative to the baseline and meeting the liquidity
requirement in a 0.08% decline.
103 . Macroeconomic Assessment Grp., Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the
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period).104 These costs are small enough to justify tighter capital and liquidity
requirements, at least along the lines of Basel III, and perhaps the related
liquidity rules (LCR and NFSR).
Conclusion
Capital and liquidity requirements are very much the focus of current
regulatory efforts to achieve safer and more efficient banking systems. While
supportive of (higher) requirements, the current analytical literature has offered
relatively little guidance on the exact design of requirements and rigorous
empirical reviews of experiences with requirements have been relatively
limited. While maybe more limited than desirable, most research argues for
higher capital requirements as private costs seem to be low while the social
benefits considerable. The analytical case for liquidity requirements is less
clear and current academic thinking seems both less advanced and little
reflected in current or proposed regulation. Even though the financial services
industry objects to (new) requirements, its arguments on the impact on the real
economy is not particularly strong.
There is also general agreement that higher and better designed
requirements need to be supported by a range of actions and regulations to have
a chance to make the global financial system safer and more efficient. To
review in detail the various other measures being put in place and actions
undertaken (or contemplated) is too broad an agenda.105 One crucial element to
highlight nevertheless is the overall approach taken to regulation and
supervision. Some of the approach has to be less "formula or model" based,
and aim for less detail and complexity in rules. Regulators and supervisors need
to assess risks in a more intuitive manner. The history of crises shows that often
what appear to be relatively useful financial innovations occurring within the
set of existing rules can grow into systemic risks (subprime and some aspects
of shadow banking system being the latest examples). To a greater extent than
has been the case to date, "judgments" by regulators and supervisors will be
needed as to what types of activities constitute potential for systemic risk.106
While a proactive, less rules-based approach can hope to detect such risks,
greater discretion will require some changes to the regulatory governance
104. It is important to note that these results apply to any increase in target capital ratios
whether its source is higher regulatory minima, required buffers, changes in the definition of capital, the
application of a leverage ratio, or some other change in standards.
105. For a progress report, see Fourth Progress Report on the G-20 Data Gaps Initiative, FIN.
STABILITY BD. & INT'L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 2013),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_131014.pdf. For an overall assessment of financial
reforms, see Stijn Claessens & Laura Kodres, 2013, The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial
Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions, Paper for the project: "Recalibrating Risk: Crises, Perceptions,
and Regulatory Change," presented, September 19-20, 2013, at Duke University, Mimeo, IMF,
Washington, D.C. for an overall assessment of financial reforms.
106. See also Haldane & Madouros, supra note 38.
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model and the internal workings of supervisory agencies. As is, agencies are,
besides at times being too close to the industry, not always well "governed" (in
terms of legal, operational and financial independence, degree of
accountability, and level of transparency). Approaches somewhat similar to
those in place today in most countries to assure the independence of monetary
policy should also be applied to supervisory agencies.10 7
A large agenda exist on reducing the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem.
Besides increases in capital requirements, possible policy measures include
limits on size and complexity and restrictions on the scope of permissible
activities (as in the Volcker, Vickers and Liikanen rules and proposals). 108
While progress is being made on bank resolution, much more still needs to be
done. This will require better frameworks, regulations and laws (e.g., for
resolving holding companies, bailing-in of creditors, and determining the
optimal design of other contingent contracts,109 and possibly introducing equity
"insurance" instruments. 110 In terms of specific tools, improvements in
practices are needed as well. If a bank is found to be short of capital, liquidity
or other required targets, sanctions (e.g., limits on dividend payouts and
bonuses, restrictions on activities, dismissal of management, etc.) will need to
be strictly enforced (and in some countries such possible sanctions need to be
tightened). For cross-border resolution (of large financial institutions), more
progress on mechanisms for burden sharing will be needed."'
Complementary work will be needed on enhancing accounting rules and
disclosure to allow market discipline to work better. Better rules and
harmonization of IFRS and US GAAP will be important, but here progress has
been minimal to date.112 A challenge here is designing fair value accounting
rules, including mark-to-market, that provide the right information on
underlying valuations, yet do not increase the risks of virtuous and vicious
spirals. There also is some hope for greater synergies between market discipline
and supervisory actions (market signals cannot just alert supervisors to
107. See Donato Masciandaro, Marc G. Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, Inside and Outside the
Central Bank: Independence and Accountability in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants, 24
EUR. J. POL. ECON. 833 (2008); Franka R. Liedorp et al., Transparency of Banking Supervisors, 61 IMF
EcoN. REv. 310 (2013).
108. Jos6 Vifials, Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Jay Surti, Aditya Narain, Michaela Erbenova, & Julian
Chow, Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural Measures
Help? (Int'l Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note No. 13/4, 2013).
109. Jianping Zhou et al., supra note 52.
110. Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, Rethinking Capital Regulation,
in FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY SYMPOsIUM ON
MAINTAINING STABILITY IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM 431 (2008).
111. STUN CLAESSENS, RICHARD J. HERRING & DIRK SCHOENMAKER, A SAFER WORLD
FINANCIAL SYSTEM: IMPROVING THE RESOLUTION OF SYSTEMIC INSTITUTIONS, INT'L CTR. FOR
MONETARY & BANKING STUDIES (ICMB) & CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH (CEPR) (2010).
112. See Nicolas V6ron, Keeping the Promise of Global Accounting Standards (Bruegel
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problems, but can also serve as formal triggers for supervisory actions). More
disclosure on aggregate risk exposures in various dimensions is surely
needed," 3 including better available (cross-border banking) data.114 Another
area is adjustment to remuneration procedures, although how to do this best is
not clear.
A new area of policy making has become macro-prudential policies.'1s So
far, only some of these approaches have been formally defined, in terms of
scope and calibration (mainly countercyclical and systemic capital surcharges,
and then only to some degree). Many other tools, such as LTVs and levies,
have been mentioned and studied as potentially useful, but in practice, policy
making with these tools is still at an early stage. Overall while macro-
prudential policies are promising and important in that they encourage a
system-wide perspective, much remains to be determined, including their
calibration to country characteristics and circumstances, their regulatory
governance, and their relationships with stress tests as a macro-prudential tool.
Table 1: Summary of the micro-prudential and system effects of requirements,
and possible other, complementary t ols necessary
Objective Micro-Prudential System







Remuneration Resolution Market Macro-prudential
Examples Scope of Cocos Bail-in, LoLR infrastructure policies
E Activities Limits (size)
113. See also FIN. STABILITY BOARD & INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 106.
114. Eugenio Cerutti, Stijn Claessens & Patrick McGuire, Systemic Risks in Global Banking:
What Available Data Can Tell Us and What More Data Are Needed?, in SYSTEMIC RISK AND MACRO
MODELING (Markus K. Brunnermeier & Arvind Krishnamurthy eds., forthcoming 2014).
115. Int'l Monetary Fund, Key Aspects ofMacroprudential Policy (June 10, 2013), http://www
.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013b.pdf.
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Figure 1: U.S. Banks' Measured Capital Ratio
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Figure 6: One Benchmark, Actual Losses (NPLs)
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Figure 7: The Fall of Bankia
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